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019 ▼a 62312441 ▼a 646954075 ▼a 651935716 ▼a 815760072
020 ▼a 9781451935219 ▼q (electronic bk.)
020 ▼a 1451935218 ▼q (electronic bk.)
020 ▼z 1589060881
020 ▼z 9781589060883
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1001 ▼a Lane, Timothy D. ▼q (Timothy David), ▼d 1955- ▼e author.
24510 ▼a Moral hazard : ▼b does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders?/ ▼c Timothy Lane, Steven Phillips.
24630 ▼a Does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders?
264 1 ▼a [Washington, D.C.] : ▼b International Monetary Fund, ▼c 2002.
264 4 ▼c ?002
300 ▼a 1 online resource (v, 15 pages): ▼b illustrations.
336 ▼a text ▼b txt ▼2 rdacontent
337 ▼a computer ▼b c ▼2 rdamedia
338 ▼a online resource ▼b cr ▼2 rdacarrier
4901 ▼a Economic issues, ▼x 1020-5098; ▼v 28
500 ▼a "This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October 2000"--Page iii.
506 ▼3 Use copy ▼f Restrictions unspecified ▼2 star ▼5 MiAaHDL
520 ▼a "The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis."--Preface.
533 ▼a Electronic reproduction. ▼b [S.l.] : ▼c HathiTrust Digital Library, ▼d 2010. ▼5 MiAaHDL
538 ▼a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. ▼u http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 ▼5 MiAaHDL
546 ▼a Available also in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish.
5831 ▼a digitized ▼c 2010 ▼h HathiTrust Digital Library ▼l committed to preserve ▼2 pda ▼5 MiAaHDL
5880 ▼a Print version record.
590 ▼a eBooks on EBSCOhost ▼b All EBSCO eBooks
61020 ▼a International Monetary Fund ▼x Evaluation.
61024 ▼a International Monetary Fund.
61027 ▼a International Monetary Fund. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00556666
650 0 ▼a Economic assistance ▼z Developing countries.
650 0 ▼a Debts, External ▼z Developing countries.
650 0 ▼a Loans, Foreign ▼z Developing countries.
650 0 ▼a Country risk ▼z Developing countries.
650 0 ▼a Moral hazard ▼z Developing countries.
650 6 ▼a Aide au d?veloppement ?conomique r?gional.
650 6 ▼a Dettes ext?rieures ▼z Pays en voie de d?veloppement.
650 6 ▼a Pr?ts ?trangers ▼z Pays en voie de d?veloppement.
650 6 ▼a Risque pays.
650 7 ▼a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS ▼x Development ▼x Business Development. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS ▼x Development ▼x Economic Development. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS ▼x Development ▼x General. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS ▼x Government & Business. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS ▼x Structural Adjustment. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a POLITICAL SCIENCE ▼x Public Policy ▼x Economic Policy. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a Evaluation. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00916975
650 7 ▼a Country risk. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00881448
650 7 ▼a Debts, External. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00888828
650 7 ▼a Economic assistance. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00901592
650 7 ▼a Loans, Foreign. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst01001083
650 7 ▼a Moral hazard. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst01026090
65017 ▼a Buitenlandse schulden. ▼2 gtt
65017 ▼a Ethiek. ▼2 gtt
65017 ▼a Kredietverlening. ▼2 gtt
65017 ▼a IMF. ▼2 gtt
651 7 ▼a Developing countries. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst01242969
655 4 ▼a Electronic books.
7001 ▼a Phillips, Steven, ▼d 1961- ▼e author,
7102 ▼a International Monetary Fund. ▼b External Relations Department.
7102 ▼a International Monetary Fund, ▼e issuing body.
77608 ▼i Print version: ▼a Lane, Timothy D. (Timothy David), 1955- ▼t Moral hazard. ▼d Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002 ▼z 1589060881 ▼w (DLC) 2002510926 ▼w (OCoLC)49835125
830 0 ▼a Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ; ▼v 28.
85640 ▼u http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=449600
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