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019 ▼a 813206858 ▼a 903698843 ▼a 961629017 ▼a 962696709 ▼a 966215517 ▼a 988499135 ▼a 992069950
020 ▼a 1475559577 ▼q (electronic bk.)
020 ▼a 9781475559576 ▼q (electronic bk.)
020 ▼z 9781475505542
020 ▼z 9781475539240
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050 4 ▼a HG3881.5.I58 ▼b W67 No. 12/204eb
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1001 ▼a Annen, Kurt, ▼d 1967- ▼e author.
24510 ▼a Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation/ ▼c prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers.
260 ▼a [Washington, D.C.]: ▼b International Monetary Fund, ▼c ?012.
300 ▼a 1 online resource (37 pages).
336 ▼a text ▼b txt ▼2 rdacontent
337 ▼a computer ▼b c ▼2 rdamedia
338 ▼a online resource ▼b cr ▼2 rdacarrier
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4901 ▼a IMF working paper; ▼v WP/12/204
500 ▼a Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Aug. 13, 2012).
500 ▼a "Middle East and Central Asia Dept."
500 ▼a "August 2012."
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references.
520 ▼a This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.
590 ▼a eBooks on EBSCOhost ▼b All EBSCO eBooks
650 0 ▼a Economic assistance.
650 7 ▼a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS ▼x Economics ▼x Macroeconomics. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a POLITICAL SCIENCE ▼x Economic Conditions. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a Economic assistance. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00901592
655 4 ▼a Electronic books.
7001 ▼a Moers, Luc, ▼e author,
7102 ▼a International Monetary Fund. ▼b Middle East and Central Asia Department.
830 0 ▼a IMF working paper ; ▼v WP/12/204.
85640 ▼u http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=568141
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