| LDR | | 03158nam u200481 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000418066 |
| 005 | | 20190215162539 |
| 008 | | 181129s2018 |||||||||||||||||c||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9780438049642 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10823770 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)princeton:12603 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 100 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Atiq, Emad Hanzala. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Practical Wisdom & Meta-normative Reflection Essays on Moral Aand Legal Normativity. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b Princeton University.,
▼c 2018. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018. |
| 300 | |
▼a 336 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-10(E), Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Advisers: Michael A. Smith |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2018. |
| 520 | |
▼a This dissertation's aim is to secure meta-normative foundations for ethics and legal theory. It consists of seven self-contained but interconnected papers. The first four form the first part of the dissertation, entitled "Meta-Normative Foundati |
| 520 | |
▼a In chapter 1, "The Hard Problem of Supervenience," I raise and address a challenge facing expressivists: that of explaining why normative properties supervene on repeatable non-normative properties. |
| 520 | |
▼a In chapter 2, "How to be Impartial as a Subjectivist," I explain why expressivism and related views do not have unacceptable ethical implications concerning moral disagreement. |
| 520 | |
▼a In chapter 3, "On Ground as a Guide to Realism," I raise problems for the dominant view on what distinguishes quasi-realism about normative properties from robust realism, according to which "real" properties play a certain explanatory role. |
| 520 | |
▼a In chapter 4, "The Normative Distinction between Quasi-Realism & Realism," I argue that the difference between realism and quasi-realism can be characterized in normative terms. |
| 520 | |
▼a In chapter 5, "Juridical Obligations at the Edge of Legality," I argue that the nature of legal normative claims entails that judges have no legal obligation to follow the law in all cases. |
| 520 | |
▼a In chapter 6, "Legal vs. Factual Normative Question," I argue that the difference between convention-dependent and convention-independent normative facts entails a difference in how judges should treat normative questions that arise under common |
| 520 | |
▼a In chapter 7, "The Limits of Law in the Evaluation of Mitigating Evidence," developed together with Erin Miller, we argue that the difference between legal and moral decision-making is a matter of constitutional significance. |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0181. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Philosophy. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Law. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0422 |
| 690 | |
▼a 0398 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a Princeton University.
▼b Philosophy. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 79-10A(E). |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0181 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2018 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14998604
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1012033 |