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020 ▼a 9780438130067
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10837034
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)minarees:15117
040 ▼a MiAaPQ ▼c MiAaPQ ▼d 247004
0820 ▼a 100
1001 ▼a Mallozzi, Antonella. ▼0 (orcid)0000-0002-4416-3923.
24510 ▼a Essence, Explanation, and Modal Knowledge.
260 ▼a [S.l.]: ▼b City University of New York., ▼c 2018.
260 1 ▼a Ann Arbor: ▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c 2018.
300 ▼a 135 p.
500 ▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
500 ▼a Adviser: David Papineau.
5021 ▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2018.
520 ▼a The primary aim of this project is to put forward a novel account of knowledge of metaphysical modality. I call this the "Essentialist Superexplanatory" account of modal knowledge, because it relies on the following two main theses: (a) knowledg
520 ▼a This account of essence has crucial consequences at the epistemological level. For essences are things that we discover empirically, typically via scientific investigation. Although the discovery of essence has been held to be a central task of
520 ▼a The Essentialist Superexplanatory account owes much to the work of Saul Kripke in the 1970s and 1980s
520 ▼a Also importantly, from a methodological point of view, the Essentialist Superexplanatory account prioritizes the investigation of modal metaphysics, and of essence in particular, for elucidating knowledge of modality. I call it accordingly a "mo
520 ▼a In the first article, "Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality", I argue that Conceivability-theory as cashed out by David Chalmers does not help cast light on knowledge of genuine metaphysical modality as traditionally pictured by Kripke. Instead,
520 ▼a In the second article, "Putting Modal Metaphysics First", I present my metaphysics-first approach to modal knowledge against the dominant tradition and lay out my positive "Essentialist Superexplanatory" account. I use chemical kinds as a case-s
520 ▼a In the third article, "Essentialist Constraints on Counterfactual Knowledge", I turn to Timothy Williamson's Counterfactual-theory. I discuss a number of problems that have been raised for it by the recent literature and argue that those all ult
520 ▼a Finally, in the Appendix, I discuss a category of potentially problematic cases for the Essentialist Superexplanatory account, namely what I call the "purely a priori metaphysical necessities". I lay out a pluralistic picture of modal space whic
590 ▼a School code: 0046.
650 4 ▼a Philosophy.
650 4 ▼a Epistemology.
650 4 ▼a Metaphysics.
690 ▼a 0422
690 ▼a 0393
690 ▼a 0396
71020 ▼a City University of New York. ▼b Philosophy.
7730 ▼t Dissertation Abstracts International ▼g 79-11A(E).
773 ▼t Dissertation Abstract International
790 ▼a 0046
791 ▼a Ph.D.
792 ▼a 2018
793 ▼a English
85640 ▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14999535 ▼n KERIS ▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
980 ▼a 201812 ▼f 2019
990 ▼a ***1012033