| LDR | | 02109nam u200397 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000419607 |
| 005 | | 20190215163818 |
| 008 | | 181129s2018 |||||||||||||||||c||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9780438191488 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10907746 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 330 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Chen, Yi. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Essays on Information Economics. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b Yale University.,
▼c 2018. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018. |
| 300 | |
▼a 178 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Advisers: Johannes Horner |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2018. |
| 520 | |
▼a The dissertation studies a range of economic interactions where private incentives hinders communication or other forms of information transmission. |
| 520 | |
▼a The first chapter studies the optimal communication problem in a dynamic principal-agent model. The agent observes the evolution of an imperfectly persistent state, and makes unverifiable reports of the state over time. The principal takes actio |
| 520 | |
▼a The second chapter revisits the Sender-Receiver game of Crawford and Sobel (1982), and examines whether allowing for long cheap talk increases the set of payoffs. We show that it does, for biases in the range [1/8, 1 8 ], and explicitly derive |
| 520 | |
▼a The third chapter examines a dynamic experimentation game in which players search for an unknown threshold. Players contribute to the rate of decline in a state variable, and the game ends with a costly breakdown once the state falls below the t |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0265. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Economic theory. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0511 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a Yale University. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 79-11A(E). |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0265 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2018 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15000804
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1012033 |