| LDR | | 02808nam u200445 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000419640 |
| 005 | | 20190215163834 |
| 008 | | 181129s2018 |||||||||||||||||c||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9780438194113 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10927841 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 501 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Maxwell, Mark Gerald. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Laws of Nature as Identities of Facts. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b Yale University.,
▼c 2018. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018. |
| 300 | |
▼a 148 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Adviser: Michael Della Rocca. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2018. |
| 520 | |
▼a I introduce a view of laws of nature on which laws are to be understood in terms of identities of fact. If it is a law of nature that the phenomena X and Y always appear together, then we can consider the possibility that the reason they always |
| 520 | |
▼a In order to understand how these seemingly disparate facts can be "identical", I introduce the "bare facts". These are what we might ordinarily call the facts, but stripped of their ontological commitments. Setting aside ontological commitments |
| 520 | |
▼a Chapter 1 is a direct investigation of laws of nature, showing how to productively violate the presupposed ontology by means of an identity of facts. I start with a historical example, where understanding an empirical regularity as an identity c |
| 520 | |
▼a Chapter 2 deals with what looks like a major counterintuitive implication of Chapter 1. Not only do I suggest that synchronic laws of nature can be explained as identities, but also that diachronic laws can be explained as identities. But then t |
| 520 | |
▼a Taking a view of laws that allows for (or demands) conceptual change will lead to different perspectives on other aspects of science as well. Chapter 3 dips into epistemology, contemplating an application to the problem of induction. Using the s |
| 520 | |
▼a Chapter 4 steps back to consider what it is for facts to be identical, beginning the project of establishing the "bare facts" as a metaphysical underpinning for the conceptual freedom that we have exploited in chapters 1, 2, and 3. To that end, |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0265. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Philosophy of science. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Metaphysics. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0402 |
| 690 | |
▼a 0396 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a Yale University. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 79-11A(E). |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0265 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2018 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15000838
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1012033 |