MARC보기
LDR02192nam u200409 4500
001000000420167
00520190215164248
008181129s2018 |||||||||||||||||c||eng d
020 ▼a 9780438010895
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10826256
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)ucla:16827
040 ▼a MiAaPQ ▼c MiAaPQ ▼d 247004
0820 ▼a 330
1001 ▼a Lu, Zhuoran.
24510 ▼a Essays on Contract Theory and Industrial Organization.
260 ▼a [S.l.]: ▼b University of California, Los Angeles., ▼c 2018.
260 1 ▼a Ann Arbor: ▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c 2018.
300 ▼a 150 p.
500 ▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-10(E), Section: A.
500 ▼a Advisers: Simon Adrian Board
5021 ▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2018.
520 ▼a This dissertation consists of three essays on contract theory and industrial organization.
520 ▼a The first chapter studies a signaling model in which a strategic player determines the cost structure of signaling. A principal chooses a price schedule for a product, and an agent with a hidden type chooses how much to purchase as a signal to t
520 ▼a The second chapter studies nonlinear pricing for horizontally differentiated products that provide signaling values to consumers with private information, who choose how much to purchase as a signal to the receivers. I characterize the optimal s
520 ▼a The third chapter analyzes a principal-agent model to study how the architecture of peer monitoring affects the optimal sequence for teamwork. The agents work on a joint project, each responsible for an individual task. The principal determines
590 ▼a School code: 0031.
650 4 ▼a Economic theory.
690 ▼a 0511
71020 ▼a University of California, Los Angeles. ▼b Economics.
7730 ▼t Dissertation Abstracts International ▼g 79-10A(E).
773 ▼t Dissertation Abstract International
790 ▼a 0031
791 ▼a Ph.D.
792 ▼a 2018
793 ▼a English
85640 ▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14998863 ▼n KERIS ▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
980 ▼a 201812 ▼f 2019
990 ▼a ***1012033