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020 ▼a 9780438152397
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10751358
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)uiowa:15566
040 ▼a MiAaPQ ▼c MiAaPQ ▼d 247004
0820 ▼a 330
1001 ▼a Guo, Huiyi.
24510 ▼a Essays on Mechanism Design under Non-Bayesian Frameworks.
260 ▼a [S.l.]: ▼b The University of Iowa., ▼c 2018.
260 1 ▼a Ann Arbor: ▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c 2018.
300 ▼a 156 p.
500 ▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
500 ▼a Adviser: Nicholas C. Yannelis.
5021 ▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2018.
520 ▼a One important issue in mechanism design theory is to model agents' behaviors under uncertainty. The classical approach assumes that agents hold commonly known probability assessments towards uncertainty, which has been challenged by economists i
520 ▼a Chapter 1 of this thesis allows the mechanism designer to introduce ambiguity to the mechanism. Instead of informing agents of the precise payment rule that she commits to, the mechanism designer can tell agents multiple payment rules that she m
520 ▼a Chapter 2 assumes that the mechanism designer does not know agents' probability assessments about others' private information. The mechanisms designed to implement the social choice function thus should not depend on the probability assessments,
520 ▼a Chapter 3 assumes that agents are not probabilistic about others' private information. Instead, when they hold ambiguous assessments about others' information, they make decisions based on the worst-case belief. This chapter provides necessary a
590 ▼a School code: 0096.
650 4 ▼a Economics.
690 ▼a 0501
71020 ▼a The University of Iowa. ▼b Economics.
7730 ▼t Dissertation Abstracts International ▼g 79-12A(E).
773 ▼t Dissertation Abstract International
790 ▼a 0096
791 ▼a Ph.D.
792 ▼a 2018
793 ▼a English
85640 ▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14997168 ▼n KERIS ▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
980 ▼a 201812 ▼f 2019
990 ▼a ***1012033