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020 ▼a 9780438036789
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10792722
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)upenngdas:13202
040 ▼a MiAaPQ ▼c MiAaPQ ▼d 247004
0820 ▼a 330
1001 ▼a Saltzman, Evan.
24510 ▼a Managing Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets: Evidence from the California and Washington ACA Exchanges.
260 ▼a [S.l.]: ▼b University of Pennsylvania., ▼c 2018.
260 1 ▼a Ann Arbor: ▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c 2018.
300 ▼a 133 p.
500 ▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-10(E), Section: A.
500 ▼a Adviser: Aviv Nevo.
5021 ▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2018.
520 ▼a Adverse selection in health insurance markets may reduce social welfare by leading some low-risk consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase coverage, relative to the socially optimal level. I study the social welfare implications
590 ▼a School code: 0175.
650 4 ▼a Economics.
690 ▼a 0501
71020 ▼a University of Pennsylvania. ▼b Health Care Management & Economics.
7730 ▼t Dissertation Abstracts International ▼g 79-10A(E).
773 ▼t Dissertation Abstract International
790 ▼a 0175
791 ▼a Ph.D.
792 ▼a 2018
793 ▼a English
85640 ▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14997718 ▼n KERIS ▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
980 ▼a 201812 ▼f 2019
990 ▼a ***1012033