| LDR | | 00000nam u22002054a 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000431437 |
| 005 | | 20200220155056 |
| 008 | | 200220s2010 mau 001 0 eng |
| 020 | |
▼a 9780262517249:
▼c \24660 |
| 040 | |
▼a 247004
▼c 247004
▼d 247004 |
| 056 | |
▼a 123.1
▼2 6 |
| 090 | |
▼a 123.1
▼b B171f |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Balaguer, Mark. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Free will as an open scientific problem/
▼c Mark Balaguer. |
| 260 | |
▼a Cambridge, MA:
▼b MIT Press,
▼c 2010. |
| 300 | |
▼a viii, 202 p.;
▼c 24 cm. |
| 500 | |
▼a "A Bradford book." |
| 504 | |
▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. [185]-194) and index. |
| 505 | 0 |
▼a Introduction -- Formulating the problem of free will -- The old formulation of the problem of free will -- Compatibilism and the rejection of an intermediate formulation of the problem of free will -- The final (or a new-and-improved) formulation of the problem of free will -- Some remarks on libertarianism -- Synopsis of the book -- Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant -- What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, assuming the OL view is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, even if the OL view isn't correct -- The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question -- The coherence question -- The moral responsibility question (and the issue of what's worth wanting) -- Generalizing the argument -- Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question -- Where we stand and where we're going next -- An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question -- The what-is-free-will question and the compatibilism question -- The moral responsibility question -- Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy -- Preliminaries -- Torn decisions -- Indeterminacy -- Appropriate non-randomness -- The argument -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then we author and control them -- The argument from token-token identity -- The argument from phenomenology -- Objections -- Why TDW-indeterminism increases or procures authorship and control -- Why this sort of L-freedom is worth wanting -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then they are sufficiently rational to be L-free -- Plural authorship, control, and rationality non-torn decisions -- Where we stand -- Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism)? -- An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism) -- An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-ndeterminism) -- Empirical arguments -- Arguments for universal determinism -- Arguments for macro-level determinism or virtual macro-level determinism -- Arguments for neural determinism or virtual neural determinism -- Arguments for torn-decision determinism, or for virtual torn-decision -- Determinism or against TDW-indeterminism -- The argument from Tegmark's work -- The argument from Libet's work -- Arguments from psychology -- Where we stand. |
| 650 | 0 |
▼a Free will and determinism. |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1808702 |