| LDR | | 00000nam u2200205 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000432591 |
| 005 | | 20200224132724 |
| 008 | | 200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9781088312254 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI13901698 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 658 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Yao, Ting. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker: Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.,
▼c 2019. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2019. |
| 300 | |
▼a 129 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Advisor: O'Neill, Hugh. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2019. |
| 506 | |
▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 506 | |
▼a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
| 520 | |
▼a The venture capital (VC) business model significantly affects the startup companies they back financially. This study explores a phenomenon that is closely related to the VC business model and fund structure-VC-led time horizon differences among board members. VC-led time horizon differences are where directors are misaligned in terms of their preferred exit times. Since VC funds have a fixed lifetime, this finite horizon causes strong exit pressure toward the end of the fund's lifespan. Although entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have similar long-term time horizons at the outset of the relationship, factors such as entrepreneurs' aggressive goal-setting, time-bound VC funds, and the uncertain entrepreneurial process can shift the synchronous time horizons initially shared by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalists. This dissertation investigates three questions: 1) Why and how often do VC-led time horizon differences arise? 2) How do VC-led time horizon differences affect board dynamics and exit outcomes? and 3) How can startups effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences? The focus of this analysis is on the board of directors, whose members are the most important people in deciding exit strategies, whether through an initial public offering (IPO), merger and acquisition (M&A), or bankruptcy.I conducted a field study to understand the origin of VC-led time horizon differences and their impact on board dynamics. I further tested the impact of VC-led time horizon differences on low-valued exits using a hand-collected dataset of U.S. VC-backed surgical device startups. The findings show that VC-led time horizon differences significantly increase the chance of bankruptcy and low-valued M&As. More importantly, the results of the systematic quantitative analysis suggest how to effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences by selecting certain types of directors (i.e., serial-entrepreneur independent directors, experienced VC directors, and by avoiding investor-executives) as well as the importance of carefully managing stage improvement when facing VC-led time horizon differences. This research contributes to the extant literature on corporate governance, VC management, entrepreneurship, and time perception. The findings have important practical implications for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and policymakers. |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0153. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Business administration. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0310 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
▼b Business Administration. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertations Abstracts International
▼g 81-04A. |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0153 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2019 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15492316
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 202002
▼f 2020 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1008102 |
| 991 | |
▼a E-BOOK |