| LDR | | 00000nam u2200205 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000433272 |
| 005 | | 20200225133106 |
| 008 | | 200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9781085789790 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI13881491 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 958 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Yang, Keyang. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Essays on Corporate Finance. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b The University of Iowa.,
▼c 2019. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2019. |
| 300 | |
▼a 111 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Advisor: Lie, Erik. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2019. |
| 506 | |
▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 520 | |
▼a In this dissertation, I examine two main topics in corporate finance: executive compensation and corporate investment. First, in the chapter titled "Import Penetration and Executive Compensation", we investigate the impact of import penetration on executive compensation. We find that import penetration reduces executives' total compensation, stock grants, and opportunistic grant timing, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms. Furthermore, we show that import penetration increases option grants and option duration, thus incentivizing more innovation and risk-taking.Second, I study the relationship between entrenchment and corporate investment. In the chapter titled "Entrenchment, Managerial Shirking, and Investment", I find that entrenchment reduces capital expenditures, R&D, and productivity, weakens a firm's competitiveness in the product market, and diminishes firm value. These findings are consistent with the shirking hypothesis that entrenchment enables managers to evade the responsibilities of overseeing investment projects. Entrenchment is a proxy for the external monitoring from the market for corporate control, while the internal monitoring from the board also play a critical role in corporate governance. In the chapter titled "Board Independence and Corporate Spending", we examine the effect of board independence on spending and payout policy using the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ board independence requirements as an exogenous shock. Noncompliant firms that are forced to raise board independence reduce the spending on acquisitions and capital expenditures and increase dividends. We conclude that greater board independence mitigates overinvestment. |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0096. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Finance. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Management. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0508 |
| 690 | |
▼a 0454 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a The University of Iowa.
▼b Business Administration. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertations Abstracts International
▼g 81-04A. |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0096 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2019 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15491189
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 202002
▼f 2020 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1816162 |
| 991 | |
▼a E-BOOK |