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008200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 ▼a 9781085774987
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI13886152
040 ▼a MiAaPQ ▼c MiAaPQ ▼d 247004
0820 ▼a 170
1001 ▼a Kirwin, Claire Elizabeth.
24510 ▼a Value Realism and the First-Person Perspective.
260 ▼a [S.l.]: ▼b The University of Chicago., ▼c 2019.
260 1 ▼a Ann Arbor: ▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c 2019.
300 ▼a 199 p.
500 ▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A.
500 ▼a Advisor: Callard, Agnes
5021 ▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2019.
506 ▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 ▼a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 ▼a In this project, I develop ideas from recent work in the philosophy of mind in order to offer a positive and novel argument for value realism. The central move is a (re)consideration of the sorts of psychological attitudes-desires, beliefs, judgments, intentions, and so on-that have typically served as the basis for the wide variety of anti-realist accounts of value. These sorts of attitudes, I argue, can only do the sort of work the anti-realist requires of them when they are viewed from a third-personal perspective. From the point of view of their possessor, these attitudes display what I can 'transparency'
590 ▼a School code: 0330.
650 4 ▼a Philosophy.
650 4 ▼a Ethics.
690 ▼a 0422
690 ▼a 0394
71020 ▼a The University of Chicago. ▼b Philosophy.
7730 ▼t Dissertations Abstracts International ▼g 81-04A.
773 ▼t Dissertation Abstract International
790 ▼a 0330
791 ▼a Ph.D.
792 ▼a 2019
793 ▼a English
85640 ▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15491490 ▼n KERIS ▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
980 ▼a 202002 ▼f 2020
990 ▼a ***1816162
991 ▼a E-BOOK