LDR | | 00000nam u2200205 4500 |
001 | | 000000433333 |
005 | | 20200225140508 |
008 | | 200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d |
020 | |
▼a 9781085774987 |
035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI13886152 |
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▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
082 | 0 |
▼a 170 |
100 | 1 |
▼a Kirwin, Claire Elizabeth. |
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▼a Value Realism and the First-Person Perspective. |
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▼a [S.l.]:
▼b The University of Chicago.,
▼c 2019. |
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▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2019. |
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▼a 199 p. |
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▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A. |
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▼a Advisor: Callard, Agnes |
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▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2019. |
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▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
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▼a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
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▼a In this project, I develop ideas from recent work in the philosophy of mind in order to offer a positive and novel argument for value realism. The central move is a (re)consideration of the sorts of psychological attitudes-desires, beliefs, judgments, intentions, and so on-that have typically served as the basis for the wide variety of anti-realist accounts of value. These sorts of attitudes, I argue, can only do the sort of work the anti-realist requires of them when they are viewed from a third-personal perspective. From the point of view of their possessor, these attitudes display what I can 'transparency' |
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▼a School code: 0330. |
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▼a Philosophy. |
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▼a Ethics. |
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▼a 0422 |
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▼a 0394 |
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▼a The University of Chicago.
▼b Philosophy. |
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▼t Dissertations Abstracts International
▼g 81-04A. |
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▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
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▼a 0330 |
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▼a Ph.D. |
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▼a 2019 |
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▼a English |
856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15491490
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
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▼a 202002
▼f 2020 |
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▼a ***1816162 |
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▼a E-BOOK |