| LDR | | 00000nam u2200205 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000433442 |
| 005 | | 20200225141626 |
| 008 | | 200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9781687912459 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI13884994 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 330 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Tu, Shunjie. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Essays on Auction Theory and Application. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b University of Maryland, College Park.,
▼c 2019. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2019. |
| 300 | |
▼a 104 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Advisor: Vincent, Daniel. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2019. |
| 506 | |
▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 520 | |
▼a This dissertation contributes to auction theory with application of the theory to the analysis of some real-life problem.In Chapter 1, I study the problem of competition between contest designers where they offer differentiated prizes to a group of contestants with some minimal effort requirements. The equilibrium among contestants is either a separating equilibrium, where strong contestants participating in high-prize contest and weak contestants in low-prize contest, or a mixing equilibrium, where strong players participate in high-prize contest with probability 1, middle-type players randomize between the two contests, and weak players go to low-prize contest with certainty. I then solve an equilibrium of contest designers where one designer's choice of minimal effort level is assumed to be non-strategic. Finally, I provide conditions such that the assumed non-strategic choice of minimal effort level is optimal and thus characterize at least part of the equilibrium set, which expands the knowledge on competing auctions.In Chapter 2, I apply auction theory to analyze the effect of a merger on 詮걊ms' research and development (R&D) investment. There is a substantial literature on the effects of mergers on product prices, but the effects of mergers on other outcomes, such as R&D investment spending, are less studied. I develop a model for evaluating the likely effects of a merger (or joint research venture) on the R&D efforts of competing 詮걊ms. The R&D process is modeled as an all-pay contest (auction) among 詮걊ms, with the payoff from investment going to the 詮걊m that invests the largest amount. I provide an explicit characterization of the equilibrium in a multi-player asymmetric all-pay contest model. The equilibrium solution then is applied through simulation to calibrate the effects of mergers on 詮걊ms' R&D efforts and e詮긟iency as well as on social welfare. I 詮걆d that each 詮걊m is expected to exert more efforts after a merger, but if there are only few 詮걊ms premerger, a merger reduces total R&D effort. A merger may also cause ine詮긟iency, but the loss in e詮긟iency is low. My results also show that net surplus increases after a merger if the number of 詮걊ms is small.In Chapter 3, I study a problem of sequential auctions and extend the standard model of sequential second-price auctions to a dynamic game with an in詮걆ite horizon with one new buyer entering the auction every period. I 詮걊st derive properties of the symmetric and stationary equilibrium, where buyers bid according to their private valuation less a pivotal continuation value, and I also show that the price path in such equilibrium is weakly decreasing. Imposing preconsistent beliefs, I give the conditions under which a stationary equilibrium exists. |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0117. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Economics. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0501 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a University of Maryland, College Park.
▼b Economics. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertations Abstracts International
▼g 81-05A. |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0117 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2019 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15491405
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 202002
▼f 2020 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1816162 |
| 991 | |
▼a E-BOOK |