MARC보기
LDR00000nam u2200205 4500
001000000433826
00520200226104844
008200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 ▼a 9781088384862
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI22616221
040 ▼a MiAaPQ ▼c MiAaPQ ▼d 247004
0820 ▼a 330
1001 ▼a Liu, Chang.
24510 ▼a Essays on Marketing Strategy.
260 ▼a [S.l.]: ▼b Washington University in St. Louis., ▼c 2019.
260 1 ▼a Ann Arbor: ▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c 2019.
300 ▼a 133 p.
500 ▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A.
500 ▼a Advisor: Jiang, Baojun
5021 ▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington University in St. Louis, 2019.
506 ▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 ▼a In this dissertation, I apply game-theoretical methods in the context of marketing research and investigate the effects of stylized facts in behavioral economics. Chapter 1 studies the effects of managerial optimism on firms' performance. Research has shown that many managers and entrepreneurs tend to be optimistic and are inclined to believe that negative shocks happen to them less frequently than to others. However, there is also evidence suggesting that such optimism is often inaccurate in reality and managerial optimism can lead to the failure of a company. We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate the impact of managerial optimism on firms' performance in a competitive market. Our analysis shows that a manager's optimism about demand can increase the firm's profit. Moreover, only one firm having managerial optimism can be win-win for both firms in a duopoly, because it can increase the level of product quality differentiation between the firms, alleviating price competition. However, if both firms have optimistic managers, the benefit of increased differentiation disappears, and firms are weakly worse off, compared with the case of both firms having realistic managers. Our research suggests that a firm should hire a realistic manager when managerial optimism is already pervasive in a competitive market.Chapter 2 studies the effects of different supply chains on firms' profitability. In many supply chains, the downstream retailer designs product quality and decides retail price, but outsources the production to an upstream manufacturer. This practice is referred to as "contract manufacturing" (CM). Sometimes, in addition to production outsourcing, the retailer also outsources the design process to the manufacturer. This is referred to as "original design manufacturing" (ODM). This chapter compares these two different outsourcing practices and develops a game-theoretical model to investigate the effects of quality design outsourcing on quality level, price, and the profits of both the retailer and the manufacturer in a market with demand uncertainty. Our analysis reveals that in ODM, the product has lower quality level, lower wholesale price, and lower retail price than in CM. The retailer is better off with ODM when demand uncertainty is low, and better off with CM when demand uncertainty is high. Moreover, when demand uncertainty is high, the manufacturer's profit may increase with demand uncertainty. In Chapter 3, using data from a Chinese textile manufacturer that supplies a major U.S. retailer, we estimate a logit model and demonstrate that, consistent with our prediction, the retailer is more likely to choose ODM and outsource quality design under low high demand uncertainty.
590 ▼a School code: 0252.
650 4 ▼a Marketing.
650 4 ▼a Economics.
690 ▼a 0338
690 ▼a 0501
71020 ▼a Washington University in St. Louis. ▼b Economics.
7730 ▼t Dissertations Abstracts International ▼g 81-05A.
773 ▼t Dissertation Abstract International
790 ▼a 0252
791 ▼a Ph.D.
792 ▼a 2019
793 ▼a English
85640 ▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15493366 ▼n KERIS ▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
980 ▼a 202002 ▼f 2020
990 ▼a ***1008102
991 ▼a E-BOOK