| LDR | | 00000nam u2200205 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000433955 |
| 005 | | 20200226134538 |
| 008 | | 200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9781088343661 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI22584317 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 320 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Model, Timothy A. |
| 245 | 14 |
▼a The Logic of Anti-corruption Campaigns. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b Indiana University.,
▼c 2019. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2019. |
| 300 | |
▼a 221 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-06, Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Advisor: Smyth, Regina A. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2019. |
| 506 | |
▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 506 | |
▼a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
| 520 | |
▼a Authoritarian anti-corruption campaigns are at odds with the recognition that corruption plays a crucial role in supporting autocratic stability. Why do autocrats, whose regimes rest on corruption, implement anti-corruption campaigns? Scholars and policymakers believe that the global spread of anti-corruption campaigns into the authoritarian world is a result of international pressure. I challenge this claim and demonstrate that autocratic anti-corruption campaigns are responses to domestic threats to regime stability rather than foreign incentives for fighting corruption.In authoritarian countries, corruption enhances regime stability. Autocrats develop an informal, collusive system of corruption to reward loyal elites in return for their continued support. The success of this quid pro quo system, however, depends on elite cooperation. I argue that distinct patterns of elite cooperation correspond to different autocratic anti-corruption responses.The argument builds on a growing anti-corruption campaign literature, which claims that autocrats use anti-corruption campaigns for economic development, power consolidation, banditry, or constituent appeasement. Each of these piecemeal explanations, however, are theoretically incomplete, because they assume that anti-corruption campaigns only achieve a single goal. In contrast, I demonstrate that anti-corruption strategies achieve multiple goals, indicating why anti-corruption scholars should study the conditions under which autocrats use anti-corruption campaigns for different purposes. I address this issue by deconstructing anti-corruption campaigns into their constituent strategies and tools. I then connect authoritarian anti-corruption campaigns to the context of corruption in which they are developed.The project deciphers the conditions under which autocrats use different anti-corruption strategies and tools by modeling authoritarian corruption's organization as a collective action problem. The model reveals expectations about how loyal elite availability and economic structure encourage anti-corruption purges. I find support for these expectations using statistical tests with original Soviet and post-Soviet data. Accompanying narratives detail Stalin's purges and compare Russia's Krasnodar and Volgograd regions. These cases show how loyal elite availability reduces the cost of purging elites, while economic concentration raises the threat that a single, defecting elite poses to regime stability. These results are consistent with the idea that autocrats use anti-corruption campaigns to respond to domestic threats to regime stability. |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0093. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Political science. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0615 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a Indiana University.
▼b Political Science. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertations Abstracts International
▼g 81-06A. |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0093 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2019 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15492832
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 202002
▼f 2020 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1008102 |
| 991 | |
▼a E-BOOK |