| LDR | | 00000nam u2200205 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000434404 |
| 005 | | 20200226150410 |
| 008 | | 200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9781085764322 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI22620081 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 340 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Jackson, Katharine V. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Corporate Autonomy: Law, Constitutional Democracy, and the Rights of Big Business. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b Columbia University.,
▼c 2019. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2019. |
| 300 | |
▼a 431 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-02, Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Advisor: Cohen, Jean L. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2019. |
| 506 | |
▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 520 | |
▼a Corporate Autonomy: Law, Constitutional Democracy, and the Rights of Big Business is a normative, interdisciplinary and analytical examination of the rights and internal governance of business corporations in constitutional liberal democracies. Drawing from political theory, economics and law, it concludes that corporations should not merit legal protections unless they first exhibit some internal democratic credentials.In contrast to theories of collective moral personhood, I argue that the question of corporate ontology should not determine the kinds of legal rights it can claim. Rather, following Dewey (1926) and Habermas (1996), I maintain that the law, as a reflection of popular sovereignty, should respond flexibly to shifting social configurations by defending the principle of equal human worth (Arendt) regardless of whether or not corporations are properly understood as "real" entities with a will of their own, aggregations of individual rights-holders, or state-created legal fictions. I argue that corporations can make a prima facie case for legal autonomy rights based upon human beings' associational freedoms. I then conclude that corporate legal autonomy rights are more likely to vindicate associational liberty if corporations first exhibit some internal democratic credentials. Permitting corporate members a voice in decision-making can ensure that corporate purposes align with the individual purposes upon which associational freedom derives. (Laborde, 2017)Nevertheless, after consideration of the literature on group agency (e.g., List and Pettit 2011) and group rights, (e.g., Benhabib 2002 |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0054. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Political science. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Law. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0615 |
| 690 | |
▼a 0398 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a Columbia University.
▼b Political Science. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertations Abstracts International
▼g 81-02A. |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0054 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2019 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15493686
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 202002
▼f 2020 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1008102 |
| 991 | |
▼a E-BOOK |