| LDR | | 00000nam u2200205 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000434804 |
| 005 | | 20200227105426 |
| 008 | | 200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9781687945020 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI22623771 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 330 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Shakhgildyan, Ksenia. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Essays on Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of All-Pay Auctions and Contests. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b University of California, Los Angeles.,
▼c 2019. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2019. |
| 300 | |
▼a 113 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Advisor: Matzkin, Rosa L. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2019. |
| 506 | |
▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 520 | |
▼a My dissertation contributes to the structural nonparametric econometrics of auctions and contests with incomplete information. It consists of three chapters.The first chapter investigates the identification and estimation of an all-pay auction where the object is allocated to the player with the highest bid, and every bidder pays his bid regardless of whether he wins or not. As a baseline model, I consider the setting, where one object is allocated among several risk-neutral participants with independent private values (IPV) |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0031. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Economics. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Economic theory. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0501 |
| 690 | |
▼a 0511 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a University of California, Los Angeles.
▼b Economics 0246. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertations Abstracts International
▼g 81-05A. |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0031 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2019 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15494020
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 202002
▼f 2020 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1008102 |
| 991 | |
▼a E-BOOK |