| LDR | | 00000nam u2200205 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000434839 |
| 005 | | 20200227110115 |
| 008 | | 200131s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9781392839300 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI27543382 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 247004 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 340 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Sprague-Rice, Aidan Michael. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a A Critical Analysis of Habermas's Qualified Defense of Strong Judicial Review. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.]:
▼b Michigan State University.,
▼c 2019. |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor:
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2019. |
| 300 | |
▼a 307 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Advisor: Hedrick, Todd. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University, 2019. |
| 506 | |
▼a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 520 | |
▼a The question of how best to resolve constitutional indeterminacy has recently returned to prominence in American political philosophy. Jurgen Habermas's contribution to this debate, which takes the form of a qualified defense of strong judicial review, is interesting, but it has not been the subject of much scholarly attention. In this dissertation I provide a recapitulation of Habermas's account, locating it within the context of both Habermas's ambitious communication theory of society and the ongoing American debate. This accomplished, I next subject Habermas's defense of strong judicial review to critical scrutiny. Through this process I demonstrate that Habermas's defense of strong judicial review does not sit comfortably with certain main premises of his social theory. Most importantly, I show that Habermas's attempt to legitimate strong judicial review runs afoul of his contention that members of rationalized societies should be expected, on reflection, to endorse a communicative criterion for analysis of the legitimacy of legal institutions. Because history teaches that there are alternative practically realizable forms of constitutional interpretation which come closer to realizing a situation in which communicatively processed public opinion influences constitutional interpretation, Habermas's qualified defense of strong judicial review must ultimately be understood as in significant tension with his overall social theory. I conclude my account by engaging in some speculation about both why Habermas might not have noticed this and what further lines of research are suggested by this analysis. |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0128. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Philosophy. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Sociology. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Law. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0422 |
| 690 | |
▼a 0626 |
| 690 | |
▼a 0398 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a Michigan State University.
▼b Philosophy - Doctor of Philosophy. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertations Abstracts International
▼g 81-05A. |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0128 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2019 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15494456
▼n KERIS
▼z 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
| 980 | |
▼a 202002
▼f 2020 |
| 990 | |
▼a ***1008102 |
| 991 | |
▼a E-BOOK |