자료유형 | 학위논문 |
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서명/저자사항 | Essays in Information Economics. |
개인저자 | Withers, John Andrew. |
단체저자명 | Michigan State University. Economics - Doctor of Philosophy. |
발행사항 | [S.l.]: Michigan State University., 2018. |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018. |
형태사항 | 142 p. |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertation Abstracts International 79-12A(E). Dissertation Abstract International |
ISBN | 9780438179790 |
학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University, 2018. |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
Adviser: Thomas D. Jeitschko. |
요약 | The first chapter of this dissertation studies a repeated interaction between a regulator and a regulated firm. In each period, the firm completes a project for the regulator, and the regulator observes the project's cost. The firm's intrinsic c |
요약 | An important feature of the interaction is that the project's cost is stochastic |
요약 | The second chapter examines an interaction that is similar to the first chapter, with one important difference: the agent's productivity, which is akin to his intrinsic cost level in the first chapter, is positively correlated over time, rather |
요약 | The third chapter considers a two period contracting problem between one principal, one agent, and an outside labor market. In the first period, the principal hires the agent to exert unverifiable effort on a project that may either succeed or f |
요약 | The agent is ``self motivated.'' That is, the expected value of the outside offer is high enough that the agent prefers high effort to low effort in the absence of an incentive wage. When the cost of replacing the agent exceeds a certain thresho |
일반주제명 | Economics. Economic theory. |
언어 | 영어 |
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