자료유형 | 학위논문 |
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서명/저자사항 | Essays on Population Games. |
개인저자 | Loginov, George. |
단체저자명 | The University of Wisconsin - Madison. Economics. |
발행사항 | [S.l.]: The University of Wisconsin - Madison., 2018. |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018. |
형태사항 | 90 p. |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertation Abstracts International 79-11A(E). Dissertation Abstract International |
ISBN | 9780438082571 |
학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2018. |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
Adviser: William H. Sandholm. |
요약 | The first chapter presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates ho |
요약 | The second chapter generalizes the model of Kranton (1996), who demonstrated that in optimal monomorphic equilibria i) cooperative behavior can be supported by strategies involving no more than two levels of cooperation, with the lower level emp |
요약 | The third chapter introduces an imitative evolutionary dynamic with minimal information requirements. Agents in a large population are matched to play a symmetric game. An agent who receives a revision opportunity observes one opponent from the |
일반주제명 | Economics. |
언어 | 영어 |
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