자료유형 | 학위논문 |
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서명/저자사항 | Show and Tell? An Experimental Examination of Customer Signals and Expert Requests in Conflict of Interest Situations. |
개인저자 | Koch, Ingrid O. |
단체저자명 | The University of Wisconsin - Madison. Business. |
발행사항 | [S.l.]: The University of Wisconsin - Madison., 2019. |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
형태사항 | 154 p. |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-03A. Dissertation Abstract International |
ISBN | 9781085620499 |
학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2019. |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
Advisor: Lim, Tai S. |
이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
요약 | Across many industries, consumers rely on professional advisors for information and expertise. Often these advisors have a conflict of interest (COI), such that they can potentially benefit from deceiving customers. In this paper, I present a series of 3 lab experiments and 1 field to delineate how customer signals and professional requests affect outcomes in COI situations. In two lab experiments, I demonstrate that customers often send trust signals to experts, and while weak trust signals (i.e., statements of trust) can improve outcomes, stronger trust signals (i.e., decision delegation) can backfire. Interestingly, however, the detrimental effect of delegation is dampened when experts can specifically request that customers delegate. Relatedly, in a field experiment in the context of taxi services, I find that passengers who signal misinformation are taken on longer and more expensive taxi rides. Moreover, consistent with the lab findings, evidence suggests that a strong signal of trust on top of misinformation can increase driver deception even further. The results have important implications for both customers and practitioners across various COI contexts. |
일반주제명 | Marketing. |
언어 | 영어 |
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: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |