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CONTENTS
Preface to the Second Edition ... xiii
Preface to the First Edition ... xv
PART ONE THE BASIC TOOLS OF ANALYSIS
1 INTRODUCTION ... 3
Ⅰ Economic Models ... 3
Ⅱ Classification of ...
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CONTENTS
Preface to the Second Edition ... xiii
Preface to the First Edition ... xv
PART ONE THE BASIC TOOLS OF ANALYSIS
1 INTRODUCTION ... 3
Ⅰ Economic Models ... 3
Ⅱ Classification of Markets ... 4
Ⅲ The Concept of an Industry ... 7
A. The Importance of the Concept of an Industry ... 7
B. Criteria for the Classification of Firms into Industries ... 8
2 THEORY OF DEMAND ... 13
Ⅰ Theory of Consumer Behaviour ... 13
A. The Cardinal Utility Theory ... 14
B. The Indifference Curves Theory ... 17
C. The Revealed Preference Hypothesis ... 28
D. The Consumers Surplus ... 32
E. Some Applications of Indifference Curves Analysis ... 35
Ⅱ The Market Demand ... 44
A. Derivation of the Market Demand ... 44
B. Determinants of Demand ... 45
C. Elasticities of Demand ... 46
D. Market Demand, Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue ... 50
Ⅲ Recent Developments in the Theory of Market Demand ... 53
A. The Pragmatic Approach to Demand Analysis ... 53
B. Linear Expenditure Systems ... 58
Ⅳ The Demand for the Product of a Firm ... 60
3 THEORY OF PRODUCTION ... 67
Ⅰ The Production Function for a Single Product ... 67
Ⅱ Laws of Production ... 76
A. Laws of Returns to Scale ... 76
B. The Law of Variable Proportions ... 82
Ⅲ Technological Progress and the Production Function ... 85
Ⅳ Equilibrium of the Firm : Choice of Optimal Combination of Factors of Production ... 86
A. Single Decision of the Firm ... 86
B. Choice of Optimal Expansion Path ... 92
Ⅴ Derivation of Cost Functions from Production Functions ... 95
A. Graphical Derivation of Cost Curves from the Production Function ... 95
B. Formal Derivation of Cost Curves from a Production Function ... 97
Ⅵ The Production Function of a Multiproduct Firm ... 99
A. The Production Possibility Curve of the Firm ... 99
B. The Isorevenue Curve of the Multiproduct Firm ... 102
C. Equilibrium of the Multiproduct Firm ... 104
4 THEORY OF COSTS ... 105
Ⅰ General Notes ... 105
Ⅱ The Traditional Theory of Cost ... 106
A. Short-Run Costs ... 107
B. Long-Run Costs : The Envelope Curve ... 111
Ⅲ Modern Theory of Costs ... 114
A. Short-Run Costs ... 115
B. Long-Run Costs : The L-Shaped Scale Curve ... 120
Ⅳ Engineering Cost Curves ... 122
A. Short-Run Engineering Costs ... 124
B. Long-Run Engineering Costs ... 125
Ⅴ The Analysis of Economies of Scale ... 126
A. Real Economies of Scale ... 128
B. Pecuniary Economies of Scale ... 137
Ⅵ Empirical Evidence on the Shape of Costs ... 137
A. Statistical Cost Studies ... 138
B. Studies Based on Questionnaires ... 143
C. Engineering Cost Studies ... 143
D. Statistical Production Functions ... 146
E. The Survivor Technique ... 146
Ⅶ The Relevance of the Shape of Costs in Decision-making ... 148
PART TWO THEORY OF THE FIRM
SECTION A : PERFECT COMPETITION, MONOPOLY, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
5 PERFECT COMPETITION ... 154
Ⅰ Assumptions ... 154
Ⅱ Short-Run Equilibrium ... 155
A. Equilibrium of the Firm in the Short Run ... 155
B. The Supply Curve of the Firm and the Industry ... 159
C. Short-Run Equilibrium of the Industry ... 160
Ⅲ Long-Run Equilibrium ... 160
A. Equilibrium of the Firm in the Long Run ... 160
B. Equilibrium of the Industry in the Long Run ... 161
C. Optimal Resource Allocation ... 163
Ⅳ Dynamic Changes and Industry Equilibrium ... 164
A. Shift in the Market Demand ... 164
B. Predictions of the Perfect Competition Model when Costs Change ... 167
C. Effects of Imposition of a Tax ... 168
6 MONOPOLY ... 171
Ⅰ Definition ... 171
Ⅱ Demand and Revenue ... 171
Ⅲ Costs ... 174
Ⅳ Equilibrium of the Monopolist ... 174
A. Short-Run Equilibrium ... 174
B. Long-Run Equilibrium ... 177
Ⅴ Predictions in Dynamic Changes ... 179
A. Shift in the Market Demand ... 179
B. An Increase in the Costs of the Monopolist ... 181
C. Imposition of a Tax ... 182
Ⅵ Comparison of Pure Competition and Monopoly ... 183
Ⅶ The Multiplant Firm ... 186
Ⅷ Bilateral Monopoly ... 189
7 PRICE DISCRIMINATION ... 192
Ⅰ Assumptions ... 192
Ⅱ The Model ... 192
Ⅲ Effects of Price Discrimination ... 195
Ⅳ Price Discrimination and Elasticity of Demand ... 198
Ⅴ Price Discrimination and the Existence of the Industry ... 199
Ⅵ Government-Regulated Monopoly ... 200
8 MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION ... 202
Ⅰ Assumptions ... 203
Ⅱ Costs ... 203
Ⅲ Product Differentiation and the Demand Curve ... 204
Ⅳ The Concepts of the Industry and the Group ... 204
Ⅴ Equilibrium of the Firm ... 205
Ⅵ Critique ... 209
Ⅶ Comparison with Pure Competition ... 212
SECTION B : CLASSICAL OLIGOPOLY
9 NON-COLLUSIVE OLIGOPOLY ... 216
Ⅰ Cournots Duopoly Model ... 216
Ⅱ Bertrands Duopoly Model ... 225
Ⅲ Chamberlins Oligopoly Model ... 228
Ⅳ The Kinked-Demand Model ... 230
Ⅴ Stackelbergs Duopoly Model ... 233
10 COLLUSIVE OLIGOPOLY ... 237
Ⅰ Cartels ... 237
A. Cartels aiming at Joint Profit Maximisation ... 237
B. Market-Sharing Cartels ... 242
Ⅱ Price Leadership ... 244
A. The Model of the Low-Cost Price Leader ... 245
B. The Model of the Dominant-Firm Price Leader ... 246
C. Critique of the Traditional Price Leadership Models ... 247
D. Barometric Price Leadership ... 248
Ⅲ The Basing-Point Price System ... 252
A. The Single Basing-Point System ... 252
B. Multiple Basing-Point System ... 253
SECTION C : AVERAGE-COST PRICING
11 A CRITIQUE OF THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF THE FIRM : THE MARGINALIST CONTROVERSY ... 256
Ⅰ The Basic Assumptions of the Neoclassical Theory ... 256
Ⅱ The Hall and Hitch Report and the Full-Cost Pricing Principle ... 263
Ⅲ Gordons Attack on Marginalism ... 265
Ⅳ In Defence of Marginalism ... 267
12 A REPRESENTATIVE MODEL OF AVERAGE-COST PRICING ... 271
Ⅰ Goals of the Firm ... 271
Ⅱ Demand and Cost Schedules ... 272
Ⅲ Price Determination : The Mark-Up Rule ... 273
Ⅳ Comparison with Pure Competition ... 275
Ⅴ Predictions of Average-Cost Pricing Theory in Changing Market Conditions ... 276
Ⅵ Critique of Average-Cost Pricing ... 277
SECTION D : LIMIT-PRICING(or ENTRY-PREVENTING PRICING) ... 283
13 BAINS LIMIT-PRICING THEORY ... 284
Ⅰ Bains Early Model ... 284
Ⅱ Barriers to New Competition ... 287
A. Bains Concepts of Competition and Entry ... 288
B. Barriers to Entry ... 289
Ⅲ Summary of Bains Empirical Findings ... 301
Ⅳ Industry Equilibrium ... 301
Ⅴ Some Comments ... 304
14 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF LIMIT-PRICING ... 305
Ⅰ The Model of Sylos-Labini ... 305
Ⅱ The Model of Franco Modigliani ... 313
Ⅲ The Model of Bhagwati ... 319
Ⅳ The Model of Pashigian ... 320
SECTION E : MANAGERIAL THEORIES OF THE FIRM ... 323
15 BAUMOLS THEORY OF SALES REVENUE MAXIMISATION ... 325
Ⅰ Rationalisation of the Sales Maximisation Hypothesis ... 325
Ⅱ Interdependence and Oligopolistic Behaviour ... 326
Ⅲ Baumols Static Models ... 327
Ⅳ Baumols Dynamic Model ... 342
Ⅴ Empirical Evidence ... 346
Ⅵ Some Comments ... 348
16 MARRISS MODEL OF THE MANAGERIAL ENTERPRISE ... 352
Ⅰ Goals of the Firm ... 352
Ⅱ Constraints ... 354
Ⅲ The Model : Equilibrium of the Firm ... 356
Ⅳ Maximum Rate of Growth and Profits ... 364
Ⅴ Comparison with Baumols Model ... 366
Ⅵ Comparison with a Profit Maximiser ... 367
Ⅶ Critique of Marriss Model ... 368
17 O. WILLIAMSONS MODEL OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION ... 371
Ⅰ The Managerial Utility Function ... 371
Ⅱ Basic Relationships and Definitions ... 372
Ⅲ The Model ... 373
A. A Simplified Model of Managerial Discretion ... 373
B. The General Model of Managerial Discretion ... 376
Ⅳ Implications of the Model ... 378
Ⅴ Comparative Static Properties ... 379
Ⅵ Empirical Evidence ... 381
SECTION F : BEHAVIOURAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
18 THE BEHAVIOURAL MODEL OF CYERT AND MARCH ... 386
Ⅰ The Firm as a Coalition of Groups with Conflicting Goals ... 386
Ⅱ The Process of Goal-Formation : the Concept of the Aspiration Level ... 387
Ⅲ Goals of the Firm : Satisficing Behaviour ... 388
Ⅳ Means for the Resolution of the Conflict ... 390
Ⅴ The Process of Decision-making ... 393
Ⅵ Uncertainty and the Environment of the Firm ... 375
Ⅶ A Simple Model of Behaviourism ... 396
Ⅷ A Comparison with the Traditional Theory ... 398
Ⅸ Critique ... 400
SECTION G : THEORY OF GAMES LINEAR PROGRAMMING
19 THEORY OF GAMES ... 404
Ⅰ Some Definitions ... 404
Ⅱ Two-Person Zero-Sum Game ... 406
A. Certainty Model ... 406
B. Uncertainty Model ... 408
Ⅲ Non-Zero-Sum Game ... 410
Ⅳ The Prisoners Dilemma : A Digression ... 412
20 LINEAR PROGRAMMING
Ⅰ General Notes ... 414
Ⅱ Statement of the Linear Programming Problem ... 415
Ⅲ Graphical Solution ... 416
A. Graphical Determination of the Region of Feasible Solutions ... 416
B. Graphical Determination of the Objective Function ... 420
C. Determination of the Optimal Solution ... 420
Ⅳ The Simplex Method ... 423
A. The Iterative Procedure ... 424
Ⅴ The Dual Problem and Shadow Prices ... 434
PART THREE FACTOR PRICING GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY WELFARE ECONOMICS
21 PRICING OF FACTORS OF PRODUCTION AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION ... 437
Introductory Remarks ... 437
Ⅰ Factor Pricing ... 438
A. Factor Pricing in Perfectly Competitive Markets ... 438
1 The Demand for Labour in Perfectly Competitive Markets ... 439
(ⅰ) Demand of a Finn for a Single Variable Factor ... 439
(ⅱ) Demand of a Firm for Several Variable Factors ... 444
(ⅲ) Market Demand for a Factor ... 447
2 The Supply of Labour in Perfectly Competitive Markets ... 447
(ⅰ) Supply of Labour by an Individual ... 448
(ⅱ) Market Supply of Labour ... 450
3 The Determination of the Factor Price in Perfect Markets ... 450
B. Factor Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets ... 451
Model A Monopolistic Power in the Product Market ... 451
(a) Demand of the Firm for a Single Variable Factor ... 451
(b) Demand of the Firm for a Variable Factor When Several Factors are Used ... 455
(c) The Market Demand for and Supply of Labour ... 456
Model B Monopsonistic Power in the Factor Market ... 458
(a) The Monopsonist Uses a Single Variable Factor ... 458
(b) The Monopsonist Uses Several Variable Factors ... 462
Model C Bilateral Monopoly ... 463
Model D Competitive Buyer-Firm versus Monopoly Union ... 465
Ⅱ Elasticity of Factor Substitution, Technological Progress and Income Distribution ... 468
A. Elasticity of Input Substitution and the Shares of Factors of Production ... 468
B. Technological Progress and Income Distribution ... 471
Ⅲ Some Additional Topics on Factor Pricing and Income Distribution ... 472
A. The Price of Fixed Factors : Rents and Quasi Rents ... 472
B. Non-homogeneous Factors and Wage Differentials ... 475
C. The Adding Up Problem : Product Exhaustion Theorems ... 477
1. Eulers Product Exhaustion Theorem ... 478
2. Clark-Wicksteed-Walras Product Exhaustion Theorem ... 479
22 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY ... 484
A. Interdependence in the Economy ... 484
B. The Walrasian System ... 486
C. Existence, Uniqueness and Stability of an Equilibrium ... 489
D. A Graphical Illustration of the Path to General Equilibrium ... 491
E. A Graphical Treatment of the Two-Factor, Two-Commodity, Two-Consumer General Equilibrium System(2 ×2 ×2 Model) ... 495
1. The Assumptions of the 2 × 2 × 2 Model ... 496
2. Static Properties of a General Equilibrium State ... 497
(a) Equilibrium of Production ... 497
(b) Equilibrium of Consumption ... 501
(c) Simultaneous Equilibrium of Production and Consumption ... 503
3. General Equilibrium and the Allocation of Resources ... 504
4. Prices of Commodities and Factors ... 505
5. Factor Ownership and Income Distribution ... 507
F. Concluding Remarks ... 509
G. Appendix to Chapter 22 ... 510
Section Ⅰ Extension of the Simple General Equilibrium Model to Any Number of Households, Commodities and Factors of Production ... 510
Section Ⅱ Some Comments on the Existence, Stability and Uniqueness of General Equilibrium ... 515
Section Ⅲ Money and General Equilibrium ... 517
23 WELFARE ECONOMICS ... 524
A. Criteria of Social Welfare ... 524
1. Growth of GNP as a Welfare Criterion ... 524
2. Benthams Criterion ... 525
3. A Cardinalist Criterion ... 525
4. The Pareto-Optimality Criterion ... 526
5. The Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Criterion ... 529
6. The Bergson Criterion Social Welfare Function ... 529
B. Maximisation of Social Welfare ... 530
1. Derivation of the Grand Utility Possibility Frontier ... 531
2. Determination of the Welfare-Maximising State ... 533
C. Determination of the Welfare-Maximising Output-Mix, Commodity Distribution and Resource Allocation ... 534
D. Welfare Maximisation and Perfect Competition ... 536
E. Critique and Extensions ... 538
1. Extension to Many Factors, Products and Consumers ... 538
2. Corner Solutions ... 538
3. Existence of Community Indifference Curves ... 539
4. Elastic Supply of Factors ... 540
5. Joint and Intermediate Products ... 541
6. Decreasing Returns to Scale ... 541
7. Externalities in Production and Consumption ... 541
8. Kinked Isoquants ... 545
9. Convex Isoquants ... 545
10. Increasing Returns to Scale ... 546
11. Indivisibilities in the Production Processes ... 549
24 CONCLUDING REMARKS ... 551
Select Bibliography ... 553
Subject Index ... 571
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