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CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ... xi
Introduction ... xiii
SECTION 1 FIRST AND SECOND THOUGHTS ... 1
1 The Arrival of the Bomb ... 3
The transformation of war ... 3
Strategic bombardment ... 4
The p...
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목차 전체
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ... xi
Introduction ... xiii
SECTION 1 FIRST AND SECOND THOUGHTS ... 1
1 The Arrival of the Bomb ... 3
The transformation of war ... 3
Strategic bombardment ... 4
The political science of airpower ... 6
The experience of World War Ⅱ ... 10
Retaliation and the 'V' weapons ... 12
The atom bomb ... 14
The strategy of Hiroshima ... 16
2 Offence and Defence ... 22
The persistence of the doctrine of strategic bombardment ... 22
The new strategic environment ... 24
The possibility of defence ... 30
3 Aggression and Retaliation ... 34
The vital first blow ... 34
The atom bomb and aggressors ... 36
Early thoughts on deterrence ... 40
SECTION 2 TOWARDS A POLICY OF DETERRENCE ... 45
4 Strategy for an Atomic Monopoly ... 47
Atom bombs and the American way of war ... 47
The limits of the bomb ... 48
First or last resort ... 51
The bomb enters war plans ... 53
Atom bombs and the Soviet way of war ... 56
The Permanently Operating Factors ... 58
5 Strategy for an Atomic Stalemate ... 63
The Soviet bomb ... 63
The 'super' bomb ... 65
Tactical nuclear weapons ... 68
NSC-68 ... 69
Korea ... 71
The conventional strategy ... 72
6 Massive Retaliation ... 76
The British conversion ... 76
The New Look ... 81
Dulles and massive retaliation ... 84
The spirit of the offence ... 89
SECTION 3 LIMITED WAR ... 91
7 Limited Objectives ... 93
Consensus on a nuclear strategy ... 93
The concept of limited war ... 97
Limited objectives ... 102
8 Limited Means ... 106
Limited nuclear war ... 106
The Soviet view ... 110
Graduated deterrence ... 112
On strategy and tactics ... 117
SECTION 4 THE FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK ... 121
9 The Importance of Being First ... 123
On winning nuclear wars ... 123
Prevention or pre-emption ... 125
The virtues of counter-force ... 127
The blunting mission ... 130
Preparing for war ... 132
A sense of vulnerability ... 134
The delicacy of the balance ... 137
10 Sputniks and the Soviet Threat ... 139
The impact of Sputnik ... 139
First strikes for whom? ... 140
Soviet strategy after Stalin ... 145
The logic of pre-emption ... 147
Conclusion ... 152
11 The Technological Arms Race ... 155
The Killian Report ... 158
The Gaither Report ... 160
Mutual fears of surprise attack ... 163
Technology and stability ... 165
SECTION 5 THE STRATEGY OF STABLE CONFLICT ... 173
12 The Formal Strategists ... 175
Military problems and the scientific method ... 177
Game theory ... 182
Prisoner's dilemma and chicken ... 185
13 Arms Control ... 190
The strategy of stable conflict ... 191
Disarmament to arms control ... 195
The disarmers disarmed ... 199
14 Bargaining and Escalation ... 208
Bargaining ... 208
Escalation ... 210
Tactics in escalation ... 211
Escalation dominance ... 215
The threat that leaves something to chance ... 219
SECTION 6 FROM COUNTER-FORCE TO ASSURED DESTRUCTION ... 225
15 City-avoidance ... 227
McNamara's band ... 228
A strategy of multiple options ... 232
City-avoidance ... 234
Retreat from city-avoidance ... 239
16 Assured Destruction ... 245
Assured destruction ... 246
Mutual assured destruction ... 247
Dissillusion with defence ... 249
The action-reaction phenomenon ... 254
17 The Soviet Approach to Deterrence ... 257
The strategic learning curve ... 257
Guidelines for stability ... 259
A 'second-best deterrent' ... 261
The American challenge ... 264
The Brezhnev years ... 269
18 The Chinese Connection ... 273
The People's War ... 274
Atom bombs as paper tigers ... 276
SECTION 7 THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION ... 283
19 A Conventional Defence for Europe ... 285
Theories of conventional war ... 287
European attitudes ... 293
Towards a conventional balance ... 296
Conclusion ... 301
20 The European Nuclear Option : (ⅰ) Anglo-Saxon Views ... 303
NATO and the Nth problem ... 304
The British nuclear force ... 307
21 The European Nuclear Option : (ⅱ) French and German Views ... 313
Gallois ... 314
Beaufre ... 318
De Gaulle ... 320
German strategy ... 324
The multilateral force(MLF) ... 327
Conclusion ... 329
SECTION 8 RETREAT FROM ASSURED DESTRUCTION ... 331
22 Military-Industrial Complexities ... 333
The McNamara legacy ... 335
The military-industrial complex ... 337
Force planning under Nixon ... 340
23 The Consensus Undermined ... 344
The Soviet build-up ... 345
The action-inaction phenomenon ... 347
The shame of assured destruction ... 348
New technologies ... 351
Arms control ... 354
24 Parity ... 359
Calm over Parity ... 360
Concern over superiority ... 364
Perceptions ... 367
Measuring the balance ... 369
25 Selective Options ... 372
If deterrence should 'fail' ... 372
The search for options ... 375
'The Schlesinger doctrine' ... 377
Options for a European war ... 383
ICBM vulnerability ... 387
The political science of nuclear strategy ... 392
26 Conclusion ... 396
Notes ... 401
Bibliography ... 441
Subject Index ... 461
Name Index ... 468
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