자료유형 | 학위논문 |
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서명/저자사항 | Essays in Microeconomics. |
개인저자 | McClellan, Andrew Alan. |
단체저자명 | New York University. Economics. |
발행사항 | [S.l.]: New York University., 2018. |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018. |
형태사항 | 264 p. |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertation Abstracts International 79-12A(E). Dissertation Abstract International |
ISBN | 9780438170698 |
학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2018. |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
Advisers: Debraj Ray |
요약 | This dissertation consists of three chapters, each of them containing an essay that is related to mechanism design, either through the design of information policies or in dynamic settings. |
요약 | The first chapter, "Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms," investigates how to design approval rules incentivize an agent to perform experimentation in a dynamic setting about the quality of a project. We study the design of approval rules (w |
요약 | The second chapter, "Dynamic Project Standards with Adverse Selection," looks at how to elicit information about a project whose profitability changes over time. We study a principal-agent relationship in which the agent has private information |
요약 | Finally, in the third chapter, "Knowing Your Opponent: Auction Design with Asymmetries," I study how much information to reveal about bidders in an auction. A famous result in the auction literature is that in a common-value auction, the auction |
일반주제명 | Economic theory. |
언어 | 영어 |
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: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |