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Essays on Information Economics: Information Markets, Social Learning, and Information Design
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Essays on Information Economics: Information Markets, Social Learning, and Information Design. |
| 개인저자 | Ma, Yingju. |
| 단체저자명 | University of California, Los Angeles. Economics 0246. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: University of California, Los Angeles., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 104 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-02A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781085656887 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-02, Section: A.
Advisor: Obara, Ichiro. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 요약 | This dissertation studies three topics in information economics. In Chapter One, "Monopoly and Competition in the Markets for Information", I analyze the generation and provision of information products, and the implications of competition in these markets. In the model, buyers face a decision problem with uncertainty about the states of the world. A buyer can purchase experiments to augment his private information, therefore the value of an experiment depends on his private information. To generate these experiments, sellers have to make an investment, which determines the most informative experiment a seller can provide. Sellers then post menus of experiments and prices. I first characterize the optimal menu given any investment level and derive the optimal investment. When two sellers compete with investment, I find an equilibrium in which two sellers split the market: one seller only serves to high belief buyers and the other serves to low beliefs buyers. Each seller specializes in generating a more informative signal about one state. Monopoly seller always provides more informative experiments, and to more buyers, than the case of duopoly competition.In Chapter Two, "Preferential Attachment as an Information Cascade in Emerging Networks", I study the preferential attachment observed in real-world social networks as a social learning problem. Networks grown via preferential attachment exhibit the "rich-get-richer" phenomena |
| 일반주제명 | Economic theory. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
