상세정보
Export to Refworks부가기능
Essays on Industrial Organization
상세 프로파일
| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Essays on Industrial Organization. |
| 개인저자 | Chaves, Daniel V. A. |
| 단체저자명 | The University of Wisconsin - Madison. Economics. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: The University of Wisconsin - Madison., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 114 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 80-12A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781392300725 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-12, Section: A.
Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis. Advisor: Hendricks, Kenneth. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 요약 | The first chapter empirically studies how firms' strategic responses to taxes affect equilibrium market outcomes. My setting is the market for new automobiles in Brazil which is a differentiated, highly concentrated, and heavily taxed market. In addition to a 25% sales tax, buyers pay an engine tax that increases sharply with size: 7% for engines up to 1 liter, 11% for engines between 1 to 2 liters, and 18% for engines above 2 liters. The tax raises prices, reduces sales, and shifts demand away from large engine models towards lower engine models, causing firms to change markups and products. To assess the impact of the engine tax on product variety, prices, markups, tax revenue, and welfare, I estimate a structural, equilibrium model of demand and supply for over a hundred different models and engine sizes of automobiles. The model provides estimates of price elasticities and marginal costs. I use these estimates to run counterfactuals that decompose the changes in prices, markups, and welfare into a tax effect and a market power effect. I also examine how firms would reposition their products to avoid the tax and quantify the impact of this repositioning on equilibrium outcomes.The second chapter empirically investigates the effect of a regulation, the Brazilian payroll loan law, on the competitive conduct of banks in isolated markets. A key feature of the regulation is the cost reduction generated by the fact that banks can offer loans to social security beneficiaries and collect the payment through automatic payroll deductions, reducing the probability of default. Using data before and after the enactment of the law and exploring the heterogeneity in social security benefit across municipalities, I first provide evidence that the law promotes the entry of private bank branches. Then, following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), I estimate an entry model with data from before and after the enactment of the law (2000 and 2010 respectively). The estimates indicate that the law increased the competition between private banks.In a joint work with Marco Duarte, the third chapter empirically assesses the hypothesis that political connections increase the profit margins of connected firms. Our setting is the Brazilian gasoline retail market. First, we expose a channel through which firms can build political influence: having politicians' interest aligned with them via electoral donations. We find that campaign donations have a strong positive impact in the probability of a mayoral candidate being elected in Brazilian municipal elections. Second, by comparing the price margins of connected gas stations whose candidate won the election by a small vote margin with the price margins of connected gas stations whose candidate lost the election by a small vote margin, we use a regression discontinuity design to evaluate to what extent political connections affect gas stations profit margins. The results indicate that being connected with the mayor increases profit margins in 7 cents per liter, which corresponds to an approximately 10% increase relative to the average margin in the sample. |
| 일반주제명 | Economics. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
