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Testimony, Higher-order Evidence, and Rational Indeterminacy
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Testimony, Higher-order Evidence, and Rational Indeterminacy. |
| 개인저자 | Leonard, Nick. |
| 단체저자명 | Northwestern University. Philosophy. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: Northwestern University., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 154 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-03A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781085640756 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
Advisor: Lackey, Jennifer. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 요약 | This dissertation has two main aims. The first is to show that relying on the testimony of others is not as "epistemically special" as many epistemologists have made it out to be. More specifically, I argue that relying on someone's testimony neither provides us with a non-evidential, epistemic reason to believe what we are told, nor does it allow us to literally inherit the speaker's reasons for believing what they say. I also argue that our practice of epistemic buck passing does not demarcate testimonial knowledge and justification as being distinctive epistemic kinds.The second aim is to develop and defend a novel view according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy, i.e., it can be indeterminate which beliefs and credences one is permitted and required to have about the proposition in question. I argue that this view provides a unified solution to a wide range of epistemic paradoxes while also enjoying some important advantages over its rivals. |
| 일반주제명 | Philosophy. Epistemology. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
