자료유형 | 학위논문 |
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서명/저자사항 | The Economic Consequences of Financial Audit Regulation in the Charitable Sector. |
개인저자 | Duguay, Raphael. |
단체저자명 | The University of Chicago. Business. |
발행사항 | [S.l.]: The University of Chicago., 2019. |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
형태사항 | 62 p. |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-03A. Dissertation Abstract International |
ISBN | 9781085624039 |
학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2019. |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
Advisor: Leuz, Christian. |
이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
요약 | I investigate how financial audit regulation in the charitable sector affects donor behavior. I propose that audit mandates alleviate the moral-hazard concerns of small and dispersed donors dealing at arm's length. My empirical strategy relies on variation in size-based exemption thresholds across states and differences in size driven by the nature of charities' activities. Consistent with audit mandates reducing donors' reliance on charity reputation, I find that donations are less concentrated on large, high-reputation charities. I show this reallocation of resources allows the charitable sector to serve more diverse geographic areas and social needs. In terms of the effect on willingness to give, I document that audit mandates are associated with a higher proportion of taxpayers who donate. However, I only observe a sizable impact on total contributions in dollars for charities that conduct activities that are particularly opaque to outside donors. Collectively, these results suggest audit regulation reduces information frictions and thereby affects resource allocation in the market for charitable giving. Nevertheless, I do not conclude on whether this reallocation of donations justifies the costs imposed on charities. |
일반주제명 | Accounting. Business administration. Economics. Finance. |
언어 | 영어 |
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