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Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina. |
| 개인저자 | Moir, Nathaniel L. |
| 단체저자명 | State University of New York at Albany. History. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: State University of New York at Albany., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 423 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-02A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781085590655 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Albany, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-02, Section: A.
Advisor: Fogarty, Richard S. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 요약 | What accounts for Bernard Fall's understanding and description of Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina? How did formative experiences during and after the Second World War actuate Fall's thought on the political nature of warfare in Indochina? What distinguished Fall's thought on revolutionary warfare from others? Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina addresses these questions through an intellectual history and contextual biography of Bernard Fall's scholarship on the First and Second Indochina Wars. Bernard Fall, an authority on Vietnamese history, society, and the First Indochina War, began to explain in 1957 that subsequent war in Vietnam could not be won through military means because political legitimacy could not be achieved through intervention. War in Vietnam was a political and social conflict and Vietnamese communists used Revolutionary Warfare to succeed. The only effective response to this form of politically-oriented warfare was wide-spread acceptance of the Republic of Vietnam's legitimacy among a majority of Vietnamese. As Fall knew, and as became increasingly evident in the later 1950s, the Republic's legitimacy could not compete adequately with that of the Viet Minh and its government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina describes how Fall identified and described the Viet Minh's efforts to undermine its competitors' legitimacy, and that of its ally, the United States, towards the attainment of its goal of political victory.The United States, Fall argued, did not understand the war in which it was engaged. He described this in a letter to John Paul Vann in early 1965, writing "Everybody speaks the platitude that the war will have to be won on the terrain and among the SVN people - and then goes on right back to one more pass with M-113's and napalm." Fall's focus on legitimacy of governance grounded his argument that war in Indochina was a political and social revolution in which overly militarized intervention narrowed foreign policy options. He sought to utilize what he learned of the Viet Minh's war against the French and the Associated State of Vietnam and apply that history and knowledge to his critiques of the United States' foreign policy in the early stages of the Second Indochina War. Earlier, the Viet Minh had successfully subverted French authority and dominated local Vietnamese governance in northern areas of Vietnam. Fall recognized that their successors, the National Liberation Front, adopted similar methods of political subversion over open-conventional war against the United States. This led Fall to recognize the importance of political processes of governance that were often unmeasurable by military-oriented parameters, writing "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought |
| 일반주제명 | International relations. Southeast Asian studies. Asian history. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
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