자료유형 | 학위논문 |
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서명/저자사항 | Knowledge by Constraint. |
개인저자 | Holguin, Ben. |
단체저자명 | New York University. Philosophy. |
발행사항 | [S.l.]: New York University., 2019. |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
형태사항 | 226 p. |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-05A. Dissertation Abstract International |
ISBN | 9781392850015 |
학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2019. |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A.
Advisor: Pryor, James. |
이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
요약 | This dissertation is about knowledge and its role in our cognitive lives. It defends contextualist, question-sensitive accounts of knowledge and belief and uses them to answer a number of difficult questions at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of language. These include such questions as: Why do we sometimes speak as if the standards for knowing are extremely high, but other times as if they require little more than an (accurate) educated guess? What's the relationship between 'believe', belief, and credence? Under what conditions should one's assertions be conditional rather than categorical? And what's the difference between lying and merely speaking falsely? A recurring theme throughout the chapters is that the concept of knowledge has a starring role in answering many descriptive questions about the mind (i.e., questions about how we actually think and talk), but a marginal role in answering normative questions about it (i.e., questions about how we ought to think and talk). |
일반주제명 | Philosophy. Epistemology. |
언어 | 영어 |
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