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Candidate Selection and Political Accountability in African Legislative Elections
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Candidate Selection and Political Accountability in African Legislative Elections. |
| 개인저자 | Warren, Shana Stern. |
| 단체저자명 | New York University. Politics. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: New York University., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 202 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-05A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781392781968 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A.
Advisor: Stasavage, David. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 요약 | Candidate Selection and Political Accountability in African Legislative Elections, is rooted in a puzzle: incumbent presidents and parties in sub-Saharan Africa and across the developing world rarely lose elections, yet individual legislator turnover is high. Why do legislators not share in the same longevity in office? How does candidate selection affect turnover and political accountability in developing democracies? Original data from 53 election cycles in thirteen countries clarifies that the majority of legislative turnover occurs before the general election, and is primarily due to parties preventing incumbents from running. These findings demonstrate that the locus of political competition in African legislative elections occurs at the intra-party stage of competition, and raises further questions about the strategic rationale behind this pattern and its effects on political accountability. To understand why intra-party turnover is so high, I then delve into the dynamics of intra-party competition, drawing on two country cases in which candidate selection is least and most elite-driven.Most African political parties involve local party elites in candidate selection. Yet national party elites may choose to impose candidates. Constituency elites may exert less effort in campaigning for non-preferred candidates, and voters may not support locally unpopular politicians. Using original data from Zambia's former ruling party, I find that imposed candidates perform less well in the competitive constituencies where performance matters most. Why would a political party choose to impose candidates? I argue that central party elites face competing demands to offer candidacy opportunities to party financiers, impede potential intra-party rivals, and encourage defection from other parties to weaken the competition.With multi-party elections firmly established across Africa and most developing countries, some political parties have begun to implement mass primary elections. Why would those at the apex of power within a party delegate the choice of nominee to a mass selectorate? Using the case of Botswana's long-dominant ruling party, I argue that mass primaries serve as a pressure valve, producing controlled turnover without threatening most senior party elites. Legislative primaries also allow parties to enjoy the benefits of expanded political participation and the removal of contentious decision-making from the political center.An important implication of my dissertation is that a key feature of democracy-multi-party political competition-may perversely undermine direct accountability between politicians and voters. Since most constituencies are partisan safe seats, candidate selection is typically where representation is determined. Yet the scope for elite manipulation is far greater in the selection process than in general elections, even when mass primaries are held. Extensive intra-party turnover also weakens the threat of electoral sanctioning, generating few incentives for in-office performance. Multiparty competition thus strengthens elite control over individual legislators at the expense of legislator-voter accountability. |
| 일반주제명 | Political science. African studies. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
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