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Social Signaling and Health Behavior in Low-Income Countries
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Social Signaling and Health Behavior in Low-Income Countries. |
| 개인저자 | Karing, Anne. |
| 단체저자명 | University of California, Berkeley. Economics. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: University of California, Berkeley., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 161 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-04B. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781085793735 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: B.
Advisor: Miguel, Edward A. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
| 요약 | This dissertation is comprised of three essays at the intersection of Development and Psychology and Economics. The essays jointly explore how health behavior is influenced by social image concerns. Starting from the empirical fact that individuals care about how they are perceived by others, the essays connect economic theory to real-world settings to experimentally test the strength of these preferences. The objective is to shed light on potential mechanisms that increase the demand for preventative health.In my first chapter, I introduce Benabou and Tirole's theory of social signaling that motivates the randomized field experiments discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. I discuss how the theoretical framework maps into a static and dynamic decision making problem. For the static setting, I consider agents' decision to take up a one time deworming treatment. For the dynamic setting, I look at agents' sequential decision making when taking their children for different vaccinations across multiple periods. I investigate how take-up decisions change in the presence of social signaling concerns (i) as actions become more visible, (ii) as the cost of actions increases and (iii) as uncertainty in the form of future cost shocks become relevant. Using simulations I contrast the qualitative predictions of social signaling with and without uncertainty. In a first finding, I show that visibility in actions increases the probability of take up, conditional on individuals perceiving the action as socially desirable and valuing others' perception of their type. Secondly, I show that the effect of cost increases on take-up decisions can be amplified or mitigated as reputational returns change. Third, incorporating uncertainty into decision making leads to less strong bunching predictions at signaling thresholds and more continuous shifts in the distribution of actions. Fourth, I lay out testable predictions for the underlying mechanisms of the model and its assumptions. Chapters 2 and 3 empirically test the qualitative predictions laid out in this first chapter.In my second chapter, coauthor Karim Naguib and I ask the question: Can social image concerns motivate adults to internalize health externalities? In collaboration with the Kenyan Government, we implement a new community program that offers free deworming treatment to 200,000 adults and emphasizes the public good aspect of deworming. Importantly, we randomize the introduction of two types of social signals in the form of colorful bracelets and ink applied to the thumb. The bracelets and ink allow adults to signal that they contributed to protecting their community from worms. To separate social signaling preferences from reminder and learning effects, we offer free text messages to a random sub- set of adults. Further, we exogenously vary the travel distance to treatment locations. We find that (1) bracelets as signals increase deworming take-up by 24 percent, outperforming a material incentive |
| 일반주제명 | Economics. Public health. Economic theory. Health sciences. Behavioral psychology. Health care management. Social structure. Social research. Sociology. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
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: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
