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Using Large-Scale Empirical Methods to Understand Fragile Cryptographic Ecosystems
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Using Large-Scale Empirical Methods to Understand Fragile Cryptographic Ecosystems. |
| 개인저자 | Adrian, David. |
| 단체저자명 | University of Michigan. Computer Science & Engineering. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: University of Michigan., 2018. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018. |
| 형태사항 | 176 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-02B. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781085671637 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2018. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-02, Section: B.
Advisor: Halderman, J. Alex. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
| 요약 | Cryptography is a key component of the security of the Internet. Unfortunately, the process of using cryptography to secure the Internet is fraught with failure. Cryptography is often fragile, as a single mistake can have devastating consequences on security, and this fragility is further complicated by the diverse and distributed nature of the Internet. This dissertation shows how to use empirical methods in the form of Internet-wide scanning to study how cryptography is deployed on the Internet, and shows this methodology can discover vulnerabilities and gain insights into fragile cryptographic ecosystems that are not possible without an empirical approach. I introduce improvements to ZMap, the fast Internet-wide scanner, that allow it to fully utilize a 10 GigE connection, and then use Internet-wide scanning to measure cryptography on the Internet.First, I study how Diffie-Hellman is deployed, and show that implementations are fragile and not resilient to small subgroup attacks. Next, I measure the prevalence of "export-grade" cryptography. Although regulations limiting the strength of cryptography that could be exported from the United States were lifted in 1999, Internet-wide scanning shows that support for various forms of export cryptography remains widespread. I show how purposefully weakening TLS to comply with these export regulations led to the FREAK, Logjam, and DROWN vulnerabilities, each of which exploits obsolete export-grade cryptography to attack modern clients. I conclude by discussing how empirical cryptography improved protocol design, and I present further opportunities for empirical research in cryptography. |
| 일반주제명 | Computer science. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
