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Agenda Control and Policy Change in American Legislatures: How Partisan Unity and Electoral Competition Encourage Change and Stasis in U.S. Politics
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Agenda Control and Policy Change in American Legislatures: How Partisan Unity and Electoral Competition Encourage Change and Stasis in U.S. Politics. |
| 개인저자 | Crosson, Jesse M. |
| 단체저자명 | University of Michigan. Political Science. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: University of Michigan., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 250 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-05A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781392688496 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A.
Advisor: Shipan, Charles R. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
| 요약 | This dissertation examines how partisan control of the voting agenda generates far-reaching and significant consequences for both macro-level policy outputs and individual legislator behaviors within U.S. legislatures. More specifically, I show how institutions and elections combine to influence the timing and incidence of policy change, as well as the effort that individual members expend in their lawmaking endeavors. In Chapter 1, I investigate how partisan control of the voting calendar itself dramatically depresses policy change. I provide strong evidence that such control, which enables majority party leaders to prevent fractures on key votes, introduces an additional veto player to a political system and drives policy change downward. After establishing this baseline effect of partisan agenda control, I next examine in Chapters 2 and 3 how competition over such agenda-setting institutions influences a majority party's propensity to set the agenda, given their expectations about the upcoming electoral cycle. To do so, I develop a dynamic formal theory of policy change, wherein majority-party agenda-setters make decisions over whether to grant agenda space to a bill, based not only on the ideological content of the legislation but also on the favorability of the policymaking environment they anticipate after the upcoming election. This theory demonstrates that agenda-setters face differential incentives to speed up or slow down the policymaking process based on their expectations about future electoral results. I investigate these predictions directly in Chapter 3, where I rely on an original dataset of reauthorization opportunities to examine agenda-setters' decisions regarding whether to change or maintain the current status quo. While results from these tests are inclusive, I find strong support in Chapter 2 for the notion that individual members respond to these different agenda-setting environments by adjusting their bill sponsorship behaviors accordingly. Using a new dataset of bill proposal and status quo location estimates, I show that members facing electoral dynamics encouraging policy deceleration will refrain from costly viable bill-writing, instead drafting bills that provide position-taking value alone. Conversely, when electoral dynamics encourage more aggressive agenda-setting, members introduce more viable legislative proposals. Taken together, these results speak to the breadth and depth of the externalities associated with empowering partisan actors with agenda control in U.S. legislatures. |
| 일반주제명 | Political science. American studies. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
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