자료유형 | 학위논문 |
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서명/저자사항 | Agency and Market Efficiency in the U.S. Health Care Industry. |
개인저자 | Brot-Goldberg, Zarek Chase. |
단체저자명 | University of California, Berkeley. Economics. |
발행사항 | [S.l.]: University of California, Berkeley., 2019. |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
형태사항 | 189 p. |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-04B. Dissertation Abstract International |
ISBN | 9781085793933 |
학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2019. |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: B.
Advisor: Handel, Benjamin. |
이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
요약 | This dissertation studies the role of principal-agent problems as a barrier to market efficiency in the U.S. health care industry. The rise of health care as a percent of U.S. gross domestic product, as well as the documented dispersion in the productivity and price of health care, demand a policy response. In this dissertation I ask how demand-side (Chapter 1) and supply-side (Chapter 2) incentives can work to increase or decrease competitive forces and affect the efficient functioning of the market.The first chapter, coauthored with Amitabh Chandra, Benjamin Handel, and Jonathan Kolstad, studies the role of principal-agent problems on the demand side. We study a large U.S. employer that changed their health insurance benefits from a comprehensive plan with no employee cost-sharing to a high-deductible health plan with significant cost-sharing, effectively increasing the price of health care to those employees. We find that, although employees do reduce their health care spending in response to this change, they do so in suboptimal ways. We find that (i) they reduce high-value care in similar proportion to low-value care |
일반주제명 | Economics. Health care management. |
언어 | 영어 |
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