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Essays in Microeconomic Theory
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Essays in Microeconomic Theory. |
| 개인저자 | Kocourek, Pavel. |
| 단체저자명 | New York University. Economics. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: New York University., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 130 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-03A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781085675543 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
Advisor: Stacchetti, Ennio. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
| 요약 | This dissertation consists of three chapters, each of them containing an essay in microeconomic theory. The first chapter, "Revealing Private Information in a Patent Race" studies dynamic and strategic aspects of R&D rivalry. I consider a patent race in which the first firm to make two consecutive breakthroughs wins the prize. A breakthrough arrives with instantaneous probability equal to the firm's R&D effort level, and its arrival is observed privately. A firm varies its effort as it updates its belief about the rival's progress. I find that a firm drops its effort over time until its first breakthrough arrives, in which case the effort jumps up and keeps increasing until one of the players patents. Further, I investigate whether a firm would want to reveal success in order to discourage its rival. I find that a firm never reveals if its rival has, and is first to reveal when a breakthrough is hard to achieve. When breakthroughs arrive quickly the firm prefers secrecy to revelation. For intermediate levels of research difficulty firm's revelation behavior entails randomization or delay. Interestingly, when there are more than two players, equilibrium always entails revelation.The second chapter, "Optimal Stopping in Patent Race Games" consists of my third year paper. This chapter studies patent race in which firms state is not persistent, instead it is a continuously changing process. The aim is to provide a mechanism that allows a principal to give a privately informed agent incentives to make decisions optimal from principal's perspective. First, a general class of optimal stopping games is studied and a simple condition under which all cut-off rules are implementable by a posted-price mechanism is provided. Further, the mechanism is applied to a patent race in which each agent has private information about the arrival rate of a discovery, and stopping represents giving up the research efforts is considered. The case in which firms have effort choice in addition to the stopping time is discusses a well. This mechanism could be used to increase welfare by reducing the duplicity of effort in case of multiple firms working on the same invention.The third chapter, "Multi-player Discrete All-pay Auctions" investigates the consequences of bidder's choice being restricted to a discrete set. An all-pay common-value auction with discrete bid space is studied. Equilibria in such auctions have been previously studied only in the case that there are at most two active participants in the auction. The main result of this chapter is that unlike in the two player case, with three or more players there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium and players always receive positive expected payoff. This equilibrium is then characterized and comparative static is provided. It is shown that player's payoff does not necessarily increase with the value of the prize or decrease with the number of participants. In fact, the coarseness of the bid space is more payoff relevant than the value of the prize. |
| 일반주제명 | Economic theory. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
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: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
