자료유형 | 학위논문 |
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서명/저자사항 | Essays on Information Economics. |
개인저자 | Chen, Yi. |
단체저자명 | Yale University. |
발행사항 | [S.l.]: Yale University., 2018. |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018. |
형태사항 | 178 p. |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertation Abstracts International 79-11A(E). Dissertation Abstract International |
ISBN | 9780438191488 |
학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2018. |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
Advisers: Johannes Horner |
요약 | The dissertation studies a range of economic interactions where private incentives hinders communication or other forms of information transmission. |
요약 | The first chapter studies the optimal communication problem in a dynamic principal-agent model. The agent observes the evolution of an imperfectly persistent state, and makes unverifiable reports of the state over time. The principal takes actio |
요약 | The second chapter revisits the Sender-Receiver game of Crawford and Sobel (1982), and examines whether allowing for long cheap talk increases the set of payoffs. We show that it does, for biases in the range [1/8, 1 8 ], and explicitly derive |
요약 | The third chapter examines a dynamic experimentation game in which players search for an unknown threshold. Players contribute to the rate of decline in a state variable, and the game ends with a costly breakdown once the state falls below the t |
일반주제명 | Economic theory. |
언어 | 영어 |
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: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |