자료유형 | 학위논문 |
---|---|
서명/저자사항 | Knowledge, Infallibility, and Skepticism. |
개인저자 | Stoutenburg, Gregory Douglas. |
단체저자명 | The University of Iowa. Philosophy. |
발행사항 | [S.l.]: The University of Iowa., 2016. |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016. |
형태사항 | 264 p. |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertation Abstracts International 80-02A(E). Dissertation Abstract International |
ISBN | 9780438381582 |
학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2016. |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02(E), Section: A.
Adviser: Richard A. Fumerton. |
요약 | I argue that to know that a proposition is true one must have justification for being certain that the proposition is true. That is, one must have infallible epistemic justification for believing the proposition. It is widely accepted among epis |
요약 | My dissertation has three main components: a metaphilosophical position, an epistemological position, and an error theory. First, the metaphilosophical position. One very important part of philosophy is the analysis of our ordinary concepts. Ana |
요약 | Second, the epistemological position. I argue that the unacceptability of sentences of the form "S knows that p but it is possible for S that not-p" is best explained by the hypothesis that our concept of knowledge requires having justification |
요약 | Third, the error theory. Of course, we rarely have direct awareness of the factors that constitute the truth of the propositions we believe. So, our knowledge attributions are generally false. Yet, they are overwhelmingly natural to make. I argu |
일반주제명 | Epistemology. Philosophy. |
언어 | 영어 |
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