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Essays on Information Economics

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서명/저자사항Essays on Information Economics.
개인저자Chen, Yi.
단체저자명Yale University.
발행사항[S.l.]: Yale University., 2018.
발행사항Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018.
형태사항178 p.
기본자료 저록Dissertation Abstracts International 79-11A(E).
Dissertation Abstract International
ISBN9780438191488
학위논문주기Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2018.
일반주기 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
Advisers: Johannes Horner
요약The dissertation studies a range of economic interactions where private incentives hinders communication or other forms of information transmission.
요약The first chapter studies the optimal communication problem in a dynamic principal-agent model. The agent observes the evolution of an imperfectly persistent state, and makes unverifiable reports of the state over time. The principal takes actio
요약The second chapter revisits the Sender-Receiver game of Crawford and Sobel (1982), and examines whether allowing for long cheap talk increases the set of payoffs. We show that it does, for biases in the range [1/8, 1 8 ], and explicitly derive
요약The third chapter examines a dynamic experimentation game in which players search for an unknown threshold. Players contribute to the rate of decline in a state variable, and the game ends with a costly breakdown once the state falls below the t
일반주제명Economic theory.
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