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Essays on Mechanism Design under Non-Bayesian Frameworks
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Essays on Mechanism Design under Non-Bayesian Frameworks. |
| 개인저자 | Guo, Huiyi. |
| 단체저자명 | The University of Iowa. Economics. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: The University of Iowa., 2018. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018. |
| 형태사항 | 156 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertation Abstracts International 79-12A(E). Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9780438152397 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2018. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
Adviser: Nicholas C. Yannelis. |
| 요약 | One important issue in mechanism design theory is to model agents' behaviors under uncertainty. The classical approach assumes that agents hold commonly known probability assessments towards uncertainty, which has been challenged by economists i |
| 요약 | Chapter 1 of this thesis allows the mechanism designer to introduce ambiguity to the mechanism. Instead of informing agents of the precise payment rule that she commits to, the mechanism designer can tell agents multiple payment rules that she m |
| 요약 | Chapter 2 assumes that the mechanism designer does not know agents' probability assessments about others' private information. The mechanisms designed to implement the social choice function thus should not depend on the probability assessments, |
| 요약 | Chapter 3 assumes that agents are not probabilistic about others' private information. Instead, when they hold ambiguous assessments about others' information, they make decisions based on the worst-case belief. This chapter provides necessary a |
| 일반주제명 | Economics. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
