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Long-term Versus Short-term Contracting in Salesforce Compensation
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Long-term Versus Short-term Contracting in Salesforce Compensation. |
| 개인저자 | Long, Fei. |
| 단체저자명 | Columbia University. Business. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: Columbia University., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 137 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-02A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781085656740 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-02, Section: A.
Advisor: Jerath, Kinshuk. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 요약 | This dissertation investigates multi-period salesforce incentive contracting. The first chapter is an overview of the problems as well as the main findings. The second chapter continues with a review of the related literatures. The third and fourth chapters address a central question in salesforce contracting: how frequently should a firm compensate its sales agents over a long-term horizon? Agents can game the long-term contract by varying their effort levels dynamically over time, as discussed in Chapter 3, or by altering between a "bold" action and a "safe" action dynamically over time, as discussed in Chapter 4.Chapter 3 studies multi-period salesforce incentive provisions when agents are able to vary their demand-enhancing effort levels dynamically. I establish a stylized agency-theory model to analyze this central question. I consider salespeople's dynamic responses in exerting effort (often known as "gaming"). I find that long time horizon contracts weakly dominate short time horizon contracts, even though they enable gaming by the agent, because they allow compensation to be contingent on more extreme outcomes |
| 일반주제명 | Operations research. Marketing. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
