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Value Realism and the First-Person Perspective
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Value Realism and the First-Person Perspective. |
| 개인저자 | Kirwin, Claire Elizabeth. |
| 단체저자명 | The University of Chicago. Philosophy. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: The University of Chicago., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 199 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-04A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781085774987 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A.
Advisor: Callard, Agnes |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.This item must not be added to any third party search indexes. |
| 요약 | In this project, I develop ideas from recent work in the philosophy of mind in order to offer a positive and novel argument for value realism. The central move is a (re)consideration of the sorts of psychological attitudes-desires, beliefs, judgments, intentions, and so on-that have typically served as the basis for the wide variety of anti-realist accounts of value. These sorts of attitudes, I argue, can only do the sort of work the anti-realist requires of them when they are viewed from a third-personal perspective. From the point of view of their possessor, these attitudes display what I can 'transparency' |
| 일반주제명 | Philosophy. Ethics. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
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