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Essays on Auction Theory and Application
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| 자료유형 | 학위논문 |
|---|---|
| 서명/저자사항 | Essays on Auction Theory and Application. |
| 개인저자 | Tu, Shunjie. |
| 단체저자명 | University of Maryland, College Park. Economics. |
| 발행사항 | [S.l.]: University of Maryland, College Park., 2019. |
| 발행사항 | Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019. |
| 형태사항 | 104 p. |
| 기본자료 저록 | Dissertations Abstracts International 81-05A. Dissertation Abstract International |
| ISBN | 9781687912459 |
| 학위논문주기 | Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2019. |
| 일반주기 |
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A.
Advisor: Vincent, Daniel. |
| 이용제한사항 | This item must not be sold to any third party vendors. |
| 요약 | This dissertation contributes to auction theory with application of the theory to the analysis of some real-life problem.In Chapter 1, I study the problem of competition between contest designers where they offer differentiated prizes to a group of contestants with some minimal effort requirements. The equilibrium among contestants is either a separating equilibrium, where strong contestants participating in high-prize contest and weak contestants in low-prize contest, or a mixing equilibrium, where strong players participate in high-prize contest with probability 1, middle-type players randomize between the two contests, and weak players go to low-prize contest with certainty. I then solve an equilibrium of contest designers where one designer's choice of minimal effort level is assumed to be non-strategic. Finally, I provide conditions such that the assumed non-strategic choice of minimal effort level is optimal and thus characterize at least part of the equilibrium set, which expands the knowledge on competing auctions.In Chapter 2, I apply auction theory to analyze the effect of a merger on 詮걊ms' research and development (R&D) investment. There is a substantial literature on the effects of mergers on product prices, but the effects of mergers on other outcomes, such as R&D investment spending, are less studied. I develop a model for evaluating the likely effects of a merger (or joint research venture) on the R&D efforts of competing 詮걊ms. The R&D process is modeled as an all-pay contest (auction) among 詮걊ms, with the payoff from investment going to the 詮걊m that invests the largest amount. I provide an explicit characterization of the equilibrium in a multi-player asymmetric all-pay contest model. The equilibrium solution then is applied through simulation to calibrate the effects of mergers on 詮걊ms' R&D efforts and e詮긟iency as well as on social welfare. I 詮걆d that each 詮걊m is expected to exert more efforts after a merger, but if there are only few 詮걊ms premerger, a merger reduces total R&D effort. A merger may also cause ine詮긟iency, but the loss in e詮긟iency is low. My results also show that net surplus increases after a merger if the number of 詮걊ms is small.In Chapter 3, I study a problem of sequential auctions and extend the standard model of sequential second-price auctions to a dynamic game with an in詮걆ite horizon with one new buyer entering the auction every period. I 詮걊st derive properties of the symmetric and stationary equilibrium, where buyers bid according to their private valuation less a pivotal continuation value, and I also show that the price path in such equilibrium is weakly decreasing. Imposing preconsistent beliefs, I give the conditions under which a stationary equilibrium exists. |
| 일반주제명 | Economics. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
| 바로가기 | 
: 이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다. |
